

An Anonymous but Accountable Proxy Multi-signature Scheme

He Du, Jian Wang

Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics / College of Computer Science and Technology, Nanjing, P.R. China

Email: {duhe, wangjian}@nuaa.edu.cn

Abstract—in a proxy multi-signature, the proxy signer can sign a message on behalf of more than one original signer. However, in some cases, the proxy or the original signers do not want to leak the proxy signer's identity. In addition, when something is wrong with the signed message, the identity of the proxy signer has to be revealed. So the problem of anonymous but accountable has been proposed. Using the technology of pseudonym and secret sharing, in this paper, a simple method was proposed to reach the target of anonymous but accountable. In the scheme, the identity of the proxy signer was anonymous, but when t or more original signers want to reveal the proxy signer's identity, the proxy signer's identity would be revealed and be demonstrated.

Index Terms—anonymous but accountable, proxy multi-signature, secret sharing

I. INTRODUCTION

As an important part of cryptography, digital signature draws lots of attention [1-3]. In 2000, Yi et al. proposed two proxy multi-signature schemes [4]. In a proxy multi-signature, the proxy signer can sign a message on behalf of more than one original signer. Based on Yi et al.'s scheme, in 2001, Lee et al. propose a new proxy multi-signature scheme with strong property [5]. Then, lots of proxy multi-signatures were proposed [6-11].

In order to verify the proxy multi-signature, the verifier needs get the proxy and all the original signers' public keys. Obviously, the verification procedure would expose the identity of the proxy signer. In 2006, Han et al proposed a scheme to solve the anonymous but accountable problem of a proxy signer [12]. But in the scheme, they use a trust third party to reveal the real proxy signer. In 2012, Du et al. proposed a method to reach the target of anonymous but accountable property [13]. But, when it comes to the proxy multi-signature scheme, the method was not appropriately.

In this paper, using the technology of pseudonym and secret sharing, a simple method was proposed to reach the target of anonymous but accountable in a proxy multi-signature scheme. In the scheme, the identity of the proxy signer was anonymous, but when t or more original signers want to reveal the proxy signer's identity, the proxy signer's identity would be revealed and be demonstrated. Compared with the protocol of Du et al., in

our scheme, the original signers need not to renew their secret keys after revealing the identity of the proxy signer.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some preliminaries employed later in this paper. Section 3 proposes the scheme of the special proxy multi-signature. We analysis the security of the proposed scheme in section 4 and finally conclude in Section 5.

II. PRELIMINARIES

Because bilinear maps and the secret sharing play the key roles in our scheme, we would describe basic properties of them, and then also list some related mathematical hard problems.

A. Bilinear Pairings

Let G_1 be a cyclic additive group and G_2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same large prime order q . We also assume that the discrete logarithm problems (DLP) in both G_1 and G_2 are hard to solve.

A map $\hat{e}: G_1 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_2$ is an admissible bilinear map [14] [15] if it satisfies the three following properties:

1. Computable: $\forall P, Q \in G_1$, there exists an efficient algorithm to compute $\hat{e}(P, Q)$;
2. Bilinear: $\forall P, Q \in G_1$ and $\forall a, b \in Z_q^*$, we have $\forall P, Q \in G_1, \hat{e}(aP, bQ) = \hat{e}(P, Q)^{ab}$;
3. Non-degenerate: for any point $P \in G_1, \hat{e}(P, Q) = 1$ for all $Q \in G_1$ if $P = O$.

Related mathematical hard problems

Here, we list some related mathematical hard problems in G_1 that we have used later:

1. Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) : Given two group elements P and Q , to find an integer a , such that $Q = aP$ whenever such an integer exists.
2. Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP) : For $a, b, c \in Z_q^*$, given P, aP, bP, cP , to decide whether $c = ab \pmod q$.
3. Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) : for $a, b \in Z_q^*$, given P, aP, bP , compute abP .

When the DDHP is easy but the CDHP is hard on the group G_1 , we call G_1 as Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group. Such groups can be found on super singular

elliptic curves or hyper elliptic curves over finite field,




Figure 1. Brief description of the scheme

and the bilinear parings can be derived from the Weil or Tate pairing.

B. Secret Sharing

Share generation algorithm for generic shareholder

The dealer D first picks a polynomial $f(x)$

randomly: $f(x) = a_0 + a_1x + a_2x^2 + L + a_{t-1}x^{t-1}$. All coefficients a_0, a_1, L, a_{t-1} are in a finite field F and a_0 is made as the secret s. Then D computes:

$$s_1 = f(x_1), s_2 = f(x_2), K, s_n = f(x_n) \quad (1)$$

$x_i (1 \leq i \leq n)$ is the shareholder's ID.

At last, the algorithm outputs a list of n shares (s_1, s_2, K, s_n) . Each shareholder P_i is distributed a share s_i secretly, $1 \leq i \leq n$.

Secret reconstruction algorithm

In Shamir's (t, n)-secret sharing scheme, the reconstruction process can be described as follow:

$$f(x_i) = y_i \Rightarrow \begin{pmatrix} 1 & x_1 & x_1^2 & L & x_1^{t-1} \\ 1 & x_2 & x_2^2 & L & x_2^{t-1} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ 1 & x_t & x_t^2 & L & x_t^{t-1} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} a_0 \\ a_1 \\ \dots \\ a_{t-1} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} y_1 \\ y_2 \\ \dots \\ y_t \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow a_0 = s \quad (2)$$

x_i is the shareholder's ID, y_i is the piece, s is the secret.

III. THE SCHEME

In an anonymous but accountable proxy multi-signature scheme, the original signers use their standard signature algorithm to sign a warrant which includes the type of the information delegated, the original signer's identity, proxy signer's pseudonym (which is correlated to proxy signer's real identity/public key) and the period of delegation, etc. As a result of the interaction between the proxy and original signers, the proxy signer generates a proxy private key. After that, the proxy signer can sign any messages according to the warrant. When necessary, (t or more) original signers can join together to reveal or demonstrate the real identity/public key of the proxy signer. The procedure can be seen as FIGURE 1.

A. Definition

In an anonymous but accountable proxy multi-signature scheme, there are n original signers O_1, K, O_n and a proxy signer P.

Definition 1. An anonymous but accountable proxy multi-signature scheme is a tuple AAPMS=(Setup, Sign, Veri, PMSGen, PMSSign, PMSVeri, Reveal, Demonstration).

- Setup is used to produce private/public key pairs as usual. The public and private key pairs for the original and the proxy signers are $(pk_{O_1}, sk_{O_1}), K, (pk_{O_n}, sk_{O_n}), (pk_p, sk_p)$.
- Sign is a probabilistic polynomial-time signature issuing algorithm, which takes input message m, signer's private key sk, outputs a signature δ on message m.
- Veri is a deterministic verification algorithm. On input signer's public key, message m and a candidate signature δ for m, the algorithm outputs 1 if δ is a valid signature on m for the entity, and outputs 0 otherwise.
- PMSGen is a protocol used between the proxy signer and the original signers. The original signers and proxy signer take as input their private keys sk_{O_1}, K, sk_{O_n} and sk_p . As a result of the interaction, the proxy signer outputs a proxy signing key sk_{pro} which the proxy signer uses to produce an anonymous but accountable proxy multi-signature on behalf of the original signers.
- PMSSign is a (possibly) randomized algorithm. It takes as input the proxy signing key sk_{pro} and the message $m \in \{0,1\}^*$, and then outputs an anonymous but accountable proxy multi-signature on the message m on behalf of the original signers.
- PMSVeri is a deterministic algorithm. It takes input the public keys Q_{pseu} and Q_{O_1}, K, Q_{O_n} , Q_{pseu} is the proxy signer's pseudonym, Q_{O_1}, K, Q_{O_n} are the original signers' public keys. The message m and a candidate anonymous but accountable proxy multi-

signature Sig_{pms} for m are also takes as input. The algorithm outputs 1 if Sig_{pms} is valid for m by the proxy signer's pseudonym on behalf of the designated original signers, and outputs 0 otherwise.

- Reveal is used to reveal the real identity/public key of proxy signer when necessary.
- Demonstration is used to demonstrate the real identity/public key of proxy signer when necessary.

B. Security Model

Adversaries can be classified into seven types:

Type I This type of adversary only has the public keys of the original signers and proxy signer. He aims to forge a signature of a warrant w of the original signer or forge a proxy signature of a message m with respect to the original signer and the proxy signer.

Type II This type of adversary has not only the public keys of the original signers and proxy signer but also the private key of proxy signer. He aims to forge a delegation signature of a warrant w that he chooses from the original signers. Note that once he can get the signature of a warrant w , he can forge any proxy signature on any message.

Type III This type of adversary has not only the public keys of the original signer and proxy signer but also the private keys of some original signers. He aims to forge a valid proxy signature.

From above we can find that if an AAPMS scheme is unforgeable against Type II and Type III adversaries, it is also unforgeable against Type I adversary.

Type IV This type of adversary has only the public keys of the original signer. He aims to get the true identity of the proxy signer from the delegation file or the proxy signature.

Type V This type of adversary aims to convince others that the proxy signer has made a proxy signature on behalf of the original signer(s) who has not delegated to the proxy signer.

Type VI This type of adversary only has the public key of the original signers. He aims to malign an irrespctive entity as the corresponding proxy signer.

Type VII This type of adversary not only has the public key of the original signers but also the proxy signer.

From above we can find that if an AAPMS scheme is unforgeable against Type VII adversary, it is also unforgeable against Type VI adversary.

Definition 2. We define the AAPMS scheme's anonymous but accountable property as follows.

Let o_1, K, o_n be the original signer, p be the proxy signer and v be the verifier, D be the dealer.

Setup PKG runs the algorithm to obtain the secret key and public key pairs representing the keys of the proxy signer and original signers, respectively.

Pre-delegation Proxy signer sends the variation of random number with corresponding signature to the

original signer.

Delegation signature generation The original signer computes delegation key and chooses the warrant w . Then he sends them to proxy signer with the corresponding signatures. w includes the Q_{pseu}, Q_{pseu} is dependent on a data which can be got from the interaction between the original signers and the dealer.

Anonymous but accountable signature generation p chooses a message m , and outputs an anonymous but accountable proxy multi-signature on m .

Verification Finally, v uses the original signer's public keys and proxy signer's pseudonym to check the anonymous but accountable signature.

Reveal/demonstrate if the original signers needed, they can join together to provide the corresponding evidence to reveal who is the real proxy signer.

A proxy multi-signature scheme is said to has the property of anonymous but accountable if no one can found the real proxy signer before the t or more original signers provide evidence to reveal who is the real proxy signer.

C. Our Scheme

Our scheme is based on Cao and Cao's identity-based proxy multi-signature scheme [8]. Let O_1, K, O_n be the original signers and P be the proxy signer designated by O_1, K, O_n . For $i \in \{1, K, n\}$, O_i has an identity ID_i , P has an identity ID_p .

Setup: Assume k is a security parameter. G_1 is a cyclic additive group of prime order q , with a generator P , G_2 is a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q , and $e: G_1 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_2$ is a bilinear map. PKG chooses a master-key $s \in Z_q^*$ and computes $P_{pub} = sP$. Chooses hash functions $H_1, H_2, H_3: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow G_1$, and hash function $H_4: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow Z_q^*$.

Extract: Given a user's identity $ID \in \{0,1\}^*$, computes $Q_{ID} = H_1(ID) \in G_1$ and the associated private key $d_{ID} = sQ_{ID} \in G_1$.

Sign: Given a private key d_{ID} , in order to sign a message $m \in \{0,1\}^*$, Randomly picks $r \in Z_q^*$, and computes $U = rP \in G_1$, then computes $H = H_2(m || U) \in G_1$. Computes $V = d_{ID} + rH \in G_1$. The signature on m is $\sigma = \langle U, V \rangle$.

Veri: To verify a signature $\sigma = \langle U, V \rangle$ on message m for an identity ID , the verifier first computes $Q_{ID} = H_1(ID)$, and $H' = H_2(m || U)$. Then accepts the signature if $e(P, V) = e(P_{pub}, Q_{ID})e(U, H')$ and rejects it otherwise.

PMSGen:

(1) Delegation generation:

To delegate the signing capability to P , the

original signers and the proxy signer do the following to make the signed warrant w . The warrant w specifies the necessary proxy details, such as the identity information of the original signers and the pseudonym of proxy signer, the type of the information delegated, and the period of delegation.

The proxy signer selects n random number $r_{pi} \in Z_q^*$ and computes $R_{pi} = r_{pi}P$, $i \in \{1, K, n\}$. Then he sends a selected R_{pi} and the corresponding signature to the original signers.

Each original signer ID_i selects a random number $r_{oi} \in Z_q^*$ and sends it to the dealer D in a secure channel.

D computes $r_o = r_{o1} + r_{o2} + \dots + r_{on} \in Z_q^*$, $R_o = r_oP$ and sends R_o to original signers, sends r_o to the proxy signer in a secure channel. Then D selects a polynomial $f(x) = r_o + a_1x + a_2x^2 + \dots + a_{t-1}x^{t-1}$, t is designated number. Then, D computes $f(ID_i), i \in \{1, K, n\}$ and sends them to the corresponding original signer in a secure channel.

Each original signer computes $Q_{pseu} = R_o + Q_p + R_{pi}$ as the proxy signer's pseudonym.

At last, the warrant used to AAPMS is $w = (Q_{ID1}, K, Q_{IDn}, Q_{pseu}, scope, etc)$

-For $1 \leq i \leq n$, O_i randomly chooses $r_i \in Z_q^*$, and computes $U_i = r_iP \in G_1$, broadcasts U_i to the other $n-1$ original signers.

- For $1 \leq i \leq n$, O_i computes

$U = \sum_{i=1}^n U_i \in G_1, V_i = d_i + r_iH$, $H = H_2(w \| U) \in G_1$, w is the warrant.

- For $1 \leq i \leq n$, O_i sends (w, U_i, V_i) to the proxy signer P .

(2) Delegation verification:

After receiving all $(w, U_i, V_i), i \in \{1, K, n\}$,

P computes $U' = \sum_{i=1}^n U_i, (i=1, K, n)$, then checks if $e(P, V_i) = e(P_{pub}, Q_i)e(U_i, H')$, $H' = H_2(w \| U) \in G_1$.

for $1 \leq i \leq n$, where $Q_i = H(ID_i)$. If (w, U_i, V_i) is valid, he accepts it as a valid delegation and continues; otherwise, he requests a valid one from O_i , or terminates the protocol.

(3) Proxy secret key generation: If P accepts all the delegations $(w, U_i, V_i) (1 \leq i \leq n)$, he computes the proxy

key as $sk_p = \sum_{i=1}^n V_i + H_4(Q_{pseu} \| w \| U)(d_{IDP} + r_o + r_{pi})$.

PMSSign: Using sk_p , P can sign the message m under w on behalf of the original signers O_1, K, O_n as follows:

-Randomly picks $r_p \in Z_q^*$, and computes

$U_p = r_pP, H_p = H_3(Q_{pseu} \| w \| m \| U_p)$.

-Computes $V_p = sk_p + r_pH_p$.

The proxy signature for message m on behalf of the

original signers O_1, K, O_n is $\sigma = (w, U_p, V_p, U)$.

PMSVeri: To verify a proxy multi-signature

$\sigma = (w, U_p, V_p, U)$ for message m under a warrant w , the verifier operates as follows:

-Checks whether or not the message m conforms to the warrant w . If not, stop. Otherwise, continue.

- Checks whether or not the proxy signer P is authorized by the n original signers O_1, K, O_n in the warrant w . If not, stop. Otherwise, continue.

- Computes $H'_p = H_3(Q_{pseu} \| w \| m \| U_p), H' = H_2(w \| U)$, then checks if

$e(P, V_p) = e(P_{pub}, \sum_{i=1}^n Q_i + H_4(Q_{pseu} \| w \| U)Q_{pseu})e(U, H')e(U_p, H'_p)$

If this holds, then accepts it, otherwise, rejects it.

Reveal: When the proxy signer's public key need to be revealed, t or more original signers can use the shares got from D to recover the shared secret r_o (method can be found from the part of **Preliminaries**), computes $R_o = r_oP$. Then they can use R_o and R_{pi} to reveal the identity of the proxy signer $Q_{pseu} = R_o + Q_p + R_{pi}$.

Demonstration: If the original signers have to demonstrate the identity of the proxy signer, t or more original signers can provide their shares to reconstruct the secret r_o . Then R_o is demonstrated by $R_o = r_oP$.

R_{pi} can be demonstrated by the proxy signer's

corresponding standard signature. So,

$Q_{pseu} = R_o + Q_p + R_{pi}$ is demonstrated.

IV. ANALYSIS OF OUR SCHEME

Theorem 1: The above proxy multi-signature is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen-message attacks and adaptively chosen-warrant attacks in the random oracle model if the Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem in GDH groups is hard to solve.

Proof. Our scheme is based on Cao and Cao's proxy multi-signature scheme [8], which is provably secure in the random oracle model assuming the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in gap Diffie-Hellman groups. We just omit it.

Theorem 2. Our scheme can stand against Type IV adversary.

From the scheme above, we can find that our scheme reaches the target of anonymous but accountable.

Proof. We suppose that the adversary would get the identity of the proxy signer from the proxy signature. Then he must has got $Q_{pseu} = R_o + Q_p + R_{pi}$. But, it is impossible, because the adversary can not get R_o from the original signer or the dealer. He cannot demonstrate it.

Theorem 3. Our scheme can stand against TypeV adversary.

Proof. We suppose that the adversary want to convince others that the proxy signer has made a proxy signature on behalf of the original signers who have not delegated to the proxy signer. Because the scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model assuming the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in gap

Diffie-Hellman groups, the adversary can not forge the corresponding warrant w , which has been proved in Cao and Cao's scheme.

Theorem 4. Our scheme can stand against TypeVII adversary.

Proof. We suppose the adversary want to malign Q as the proxy signer. In order to demonstrate Q were the proxy signer, the adversary has to output a number r_o , where $R_o = r_o P$. But it is impossible except he has solved the Discrete Logarithm Problem. Or the adversary has got more than t secret keys of original signers.

Because that if an AAPMS scheme is unforgeable against Type VII adversary, it is also unforgeable against Type VI adversary, so we just omit the proof.

We compared our scheme with Han et al and Du et al's scheme as bellow.

TABLE I.
COMPARISON

Property	Han et al's scheme	Du et al's scheme	Our scheme
TTP	Need	Not need	Not need
Security proof	No	Yes	Yes
Change the key	Not need	Need	Not need

V. CONCLUSION

Privacy has become one of the most important human rights of the modern age. Using the technology of pseudonym, in this paper, we propose a simple secure anonymous but accountable method for proxy signer in a proxy signature scheme. Unless the corresponding evidence has been provided by the original signer(s), no one can find the proxy signer's real identity or public key. In the scheme, the identity of the proxy signer was anonymous, but when t or more original signers want to reveal the proxy signer's identity, the proxy signer's identity would be revealed and be demonstrated.

APPENDIX A SECURITY PROOF

If there exists a type II adversary A_{II} can breaks the standard signature scheme, then there exists an algorithm \mathcal{B} which is able to use A_{II} to solve an instance of the CDH problem with a non-negligible probability.. Short signature is proved to be secure against existential forgery on adaptive chosen-message attacks (in the random oracle model) assuming the CDHP (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem) is hard, we just omit the proof.

If there exists a type III adversary A_{III} can breaks the proxy multi-signature scheme, then there exists an algorithm \mathcal{B} which is able to use A_{III} to solve an instance of the CDH problem with a non-negligible probability.

Proof. Algorithm \mathcal{T} is given $X = xP \in G_1$ and $Y = yP \in G_1$. Its goal is to output $xY = xyP \in G_1$.

Algorithm \mathcal{T} simulates the challenger and interacts with adversary \mathcal{A} as follows:

Setup: Algorithm \mathcal{T} initializes \mathcal{A} with $P_{pub} = X$ as a systems overall public key.

extraction-queries: At any time \mathcal{A} can query the random oracle PK . To respond to these queries, \mathcal{T} maintains a list L_1 of tuples

(i, Q_i, b_i, c_i) as explained below. The list is initially empty. When an identity i is submitted to the PK oracle, algorithm \mathcal{T} responds as follows:

- (1) If the query Q_i already appears on the list L_1 in some tuple (i, Q_i, b_i, c_i) , then algorithm \mathcal{T} responds with Q_i .
- (2) Otherwise, \mathcal{T} generates a random coin $c \in \{0,1\}$ such that $\Pr[c = 0] = 1 / (q_E + n)$.
- (3) Algorithm \mathcal{T} picks a random $b_i \in Z_q^*$. If $c = 0$, computes $Q_i = b_i Y$, If $c = 1$, computes $Q_i = b_i P$.
- (4) Algorithm \mathcal{T} adds the tuple (i, Q_i, b_i, c_i) to the list L_1 and responds to \mathcal{A} with Q_i .

H_2 -queries: At any time \mathcal{A} can query the random oracle H_2 . To respond this query, \mathcal{T} maintains a list L_2 of tuples (e_i, m_i, v_i, s_i) , as explained below. The list is initially empty. When a message m_i is submitted to the H_2 oracle, algorithm \mathcal{T} responds as follows:

- (1) If the query m_i already appears on the list L_2 in some tuple (e_i, m_i, v_i, s_i) then algorithm \mathcal{T} responds with $H_2(m_i) = e_i$.
- (2) Otherwise, \mathcal{T} generates a random coin $s_i \in \{0,1\}$ such that $\Pr[s_i = 0] = 1 / 2$.
- (3) Algorithm \mathcal{T} picks a random $v_i \in Z_q^*$. If $s_i = 0$, computes $e_i = v_i P_{pub}$, If $s_i = 1$, computes $e_i = v_i P$.
- (4) Algorithm \mathcal{T} adds the tuple (e_i, m_i, v_i, s_i) to the list L_2 and responds to \mathcal{A} with $H_2(m_i) = e_i$.

H_3 -queries: At any time \mathcal{A} can query the random oracle H_3 . To respond to queries to H_3 oracle, \mathcal{T} maintains a list L_3 of tuples $(Q_i, w_i, m_i, R_i, \eta_i)$ as explained below. When a tuple (Q_i, w_i, m_i, R_i) is submitted to the H_3 oracle, algorithm \mathcal{T} responds as follows:

- (1) If the query tuple already appears on the list L_3 in some tuple $(Q_i, w_i, m_i, R_i, \eta_i)$, then algorithm \mathcal{T} responds with $H_3(Q_i || w_i || m_i || R_i) = \eta_i P \in G_1$.
- (2) Otherwise, algorithm \mathcal{T} picks $\eta_i \in Z_q^*$ at random, stores the tuple $(Q_i, w_i, m_i, R_i, \eta_i)$ in the list L_3 and responds to \mathcal{A} with $H_3(Q_i || w_i || m_i || R_i) = \eta_i P \in G_1$.

H_4 -queries: At any time \mathcal{A} can query the random oracle H_4 . To respond to queries to H_4 oracle, \mathcal{T} maintains a list L_4 of tuples (Q_i, w_i, u_i) as explained below. When a tuple (Q_i, w_i) is submitted to the H_4 oracle, algorithm \mathcal{T} responds as follows:

(1) If the query tuple already appears on the list L_4 in some tuple (Q_i, w_i, u_i) , then algorithm \mathcal{T} responds with $H_4(Q_i \| w_i) = u_i \in Z_q^*$.

(2) Otherwise, algorithm \mathcal{T} picks $u_i \in Z_q^*$ at random, stores the tuple (Q_i, w_i, u_i) in the list L_4 and responds to \mathcal{A} with $H_4(Q_i \| w_i) = u_i \in Z_q^*$.

Delegation signature queries:

If \mathcal{A} requests to interact with one of the original signers (i.e., Q_i), \mathcal{A} creates a warrant w , and requests Q_i to sign the warrant w . \mathcal{T} queries w to its signing oracle $O_s(d_i, \cdot)$. Upon receiving an answer δ , it forwards (w, δ) to \mathcal{A} and adds the warrant w to $Warro$.

If \mathcal{A} requests to interact with Q_p , Q_p playing the role of the proxy signer, the original signers are $Q_i, (i=1, K, n)$. \mathcal{A} outputs warrant w and computes the signature $\delta_i = s_i$ for warrant w under secret key $d_i, (i=1, K, n)$. Then he sends $(w, \delta_i, K, \delta_n)$ to \mathcal{T} . After receiving $(w, \delta_i, K, \delta_n)$, \mathcal{T} checks the validity of $\delta_i = s_i, (i=1, K, n)$. If so, \mathcal{T} adds the warrant $w (i=1, K, n)$ to list $Warrrp$.

Proxy multi-signature queries: \mathcal{A} requests a proxy multi-signature on (w, m) , where Q_p is the proxy signer. \mathcal{T} responds this query as follows:

(1) If w is not in the list $Warrrp$, \mathcal{T} outputs “failure” and halts. Otherwise, \mathcal{T} has $\delta_i = s_i (i=1, K, n)$, where δ_i is the signature on warrant w under the secret key $d_i (i=1, K, n)$.

(2) \mathcal{T} recovers the previously defined value $PK(p) = Q_p \in G_1$ and $PK(i) = Q_i (i=1, K, n)$ from the list L_1 .

(3) Makes query w to H_2 oracle. \mathcal{T} recovers the corresponding (w_i, v, s) from L_2 . If $s=1$, then outputs “failure” and halts. Otherwise, it means that $H_2(w)$ was previously defined to be vP_{pub} .

(4) Makes query (Q_p, w) to H_4 oracle and return $H_4(ID_p \| w) = u$.

(5) Picks $r_1, r_2 \in Z_q^*$ at random and defines $s_p = r_1 P_{pub} \in G_1, R_p = r_2 P_{pub} \in G_1$.

(6) Defines the hash value $H_3(Q_i \| w_i \| m_i)$ as $r_2^{-1}(r_1 P - P \prod_{i=1}^n Q_i - u Q_p) \in G_1$ (\mathcal{T} outputs “failure” and halts if H_3 turns out to be already defined for the input (Q_i, w_i, m_i)).

(7) $\delta = (w, Q_p, R_p, s_p)$ is a valid proxy signature on message m by Q_p on behalf of $Q_i (i=1, K, n)$ under the warrant w .

(8) \mathcal{T} adds (w, m) to the list $IVPMS_{qu}$, and forwards δ to \mathcal{A} .

E_1 : \mathcal{T} does not abort as a result of any of \mathcal{A} 's key extraction queries.

E_2 : \mathcal{T} does not abort as a result of any of \mathcal{A} 's standard signature queries.

E_3 : \mathcal{T} does not abort as a result of any of \mathcal{A} 's proxy multi-signature queries.

E_6 : \mathcal{A} generates a valid and nontrivial proxy multi-signature forgery, where Q_p is the proxy signer.

E_7 : Event E_6 occurs, and, in addition, $c_p = 0, c_i = 1 (i=1, K, n)$ and $s^* = 1$. Here c_p and c_i are the c-component of the tuple on the list L_1 . s^* is the s-component of the tuple on the list L_2 .

E_8 : \mathcal{A} generates a valid and nontrivial proxy multi-signature forgery and Q_k plays the role of one of the original signers.

E_9 : Event E_8 occurs, and, in addition, $c_k = 0, c_i = 1 (i=1, K, k-1, k+1, K, n), c_p = 1$ and $s^* = 1$. Here c_p and $c_i (i=1, K, n)$ are the c-component of the tuple on the list L_1 . s^* is the s-component of the tuple on the list L_2 .

Output: Eventually, \mathcal{A} halts. It either concedes failure, in which case so does \mathcal{T} , or it returns a forgery.

(1) If \mathcal{A} outputs a forgery of the form (w^*, M^*, R_p^*, s_p^*) , where Q_p is the proxy signer, $(w^*, M^*) \notin PMS_{qu}$, and

$$e(s_p^*, P) = e(Q_p \prod_{i=1}^n (H_2(w^*) \cdot P_{pub})) e(Q_p, H_4(Q_p \| w^*) \cdot P_{pub}) e(R_p^*, H_3(Q_p \| w^* \| M^* \| R_p^*))$$

(i.e., \mathcal{A} forges a valid proxy multi-signature on message M^* under the warrant w^*). The \mathcal{T} recovers (p, Q_p, b_p, c_p) and $(i, Q_i, b_i, c_i) (i=1, K, n)$ from the list L_1 . Algorithm \mathcal{T} proceeds only if $c_p = 0$ and $c_i = 1 (i=1, K, n)$. Otherwise, \mathcal{T} outputs “failure” and stop. Then we know that $Q_p = b_p Y$ and $Q_i = b_i P, (i=1, K, n)$. Next, algorithm \mathcal{T} recovers (e^*, M^*, v^*, s^*) from $L_2, (Q_p, R^*, w^*, \eta^*)$ from the list $L_3 (H_3(Q_p \| R^* \| w^*)) = \eta^* P$ and (Q_i, w, u) from list $L_4 (H_4(Q_i \| w^*) = u^*)$. If $s^* = 0$, then \mathcal{T} outputs “failure” and stop. Otherwise, we know $s^* = 1$, and hence $H_2(M^*)$ was defined to be $v^* P \in G_1$. Then we can deduce

$$e(s_p^*, P) = e(P \prod_{i=1}^n b_i P, \prod_{i=1}^n (v^* P \cdot P_{pub})) e(b_p Y, P_{pub})^{u^*} e(R_p^*, \eta^* P)$$

\mathcal{T} calculates and outputs the required xY as $b_p^{-1} u^{*-1} (s_p^* - \prod_{i=1}^n [(v^* P \cdot P_{pub}) b_i P] - \eta^* R_p^*)$.

(2) If \mathcal{A} outputs a forgery of the form (w^*, M^*, R_p^*, s_p^*) , where Q_p is the proxy signer, Q_k is one of the original signers, and $(w^*, M^*) \notin PMS_{qu}$, and

$$e(s_p^*, P) = e(Q_k, H_2(w^*) \cdot P_{pub}) e(Q_p \prod_{i=1}^n (H_2(w^*) \cdot P_{pub})) e(Q_p, H_4(Q_p \| w^*) \cdot P_{pub}) e(R_p^*, H_3(Q_p \| w^* \| M^* \| R_p^*))$$

$(i \neq k)$ (i.e., \mathcal{A} forges a valid proxy multi-signature

and Q_k plays the role of one of the original signers.) \mathcal{T} recovers (p, Q_p, b_p, c_p) and (i, Q_i, b_i, c_i) ($i=1, K, n$) from the list L_1 . Algorithm \mathcal{T} proceeds only if $c_p = 0$ and $c_i = 1$ ($i=1, K, n$). Otherwise, \mathcal{T} outputs “failure” and stop. Then we know that $Q_k = b_k Y$ and $Q_i = b_i P$, ($i=1, K, k-1, k+1, K, n$). Next, algorithm \mathcal{T} recovers (e^*, M^*, v^*, s^*) from L_2 , (Q_p, R^*, w^*, η^*) from the list L_3 ($H_3(Q_p \| R^* \| w^*) = \eta^* P$ and (Q_i, w, u) from list L_4 ($H_4(Q_i \| w^*) = u^*$). If $s^* = 0$, then \mathcal{T} outputs “failure” and stop. Otherwise, we know $s^* = 1$, and hence $H_2(M^*)$ was defined to be $v^* P \in G_1$. Then we can deduce

$$e(s_p^*, P) = e(b_K Y, H_2(w^*) \cdot P_{pub})$$

$$e(P \prod_{i=1}^n b_i P, \prod_{i=1}^n (v^* P \cdot P_{pub})) e(b_p P, P_{pub})^{v^*} e(R_p^*, \eta^* P)$$

\mathcal{T} calculates and outputs the required xY as

$$b_k^{-1} (s_p^* - v^* P \cdot P_{pub} - \prod_{i=1}^n [(v^* P \cdot P_{pub}) b_i P] - u^* b_p P_{pub} - \eta^* R_p^*)$$

Adversary A_{III} succeeds if events $(E_1, E_2, E_3, E_6, E_7)$ happen, the probability $\Pr[E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge E_3 \wedge E_6 \wedge E_7]$ can be decomposed as

$$\Pr[E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge E_3 \wedge E_6 \wedge E_7]$$

$$= \Pr[E_1] \Pr[E_2 | E_1] \Pr[E_3 | E_1 \wedge E_2]$$

$$\Pr[E_6 | E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge E_3] \Pr[E_7 | E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge E_3 \wedge E_6]$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{4} (1 - q_s(q_{H_2} + q_s) 2^{-k}) (1 - q_{PMS}(q_{H_3} + q_{PMS}) 2^{-k})$$

$$(1 - \frac{1}{q_E + n})^{q_E + n} (\frac{1}{q_E + n}) \Pr[E_6 | E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge E_3]$$

Adversary A_{III} succeeds if events $(E_1, E_2, E_3, E_8, E_9)$ happen, the probability $\Pr[E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge E_3 \wedge E_8 \wedge E_9]$ can be decomposed as

$$\Pr[E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge E_3 \wedge E_8 \wedge E_9]$$

$$= \Pr[E_1] \Pr[E_2 | E_1] \Pr[E_3 | E_1 \wedge E_2] \Pr[E_8 | E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge E_3]$$

$$\Pr[E_9 | E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge E_3 \wedge E_8]$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{4} (1 - q_s(q_{H_2} + q_s) 2^{-k}) (1 - q_{PMS}(q_{H_3} + q_{PMS}) 2^{-k})$$

$$(1 - \frac{1}{q_E + n})^{q_E + n} (\frac{1}{q_E + n}) \Pr[E_8 | E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge E_3]$$

$$\Pr[E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge E_3 \wedge E_6 \wedge E_7] + \Pr[E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge E_3 \wedge E_8 \wedge E_9]$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{4} (1 - q_s(q_{H_2} + q_s) 2^{-k}) (1 - q_{PMS}(q_{H_3} + q_{PMS}) 2^{-k})$$

$$(1 - \frac{1}{q_E + n})^{q_E + n} (\frac{\epsilon}{q_E + n})$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{4} (1 - q_s(q_{H_2} + q_s) 2^{-k}) (1 - q_{PMS}(q_{H_3} + q_{PMS}) 2^{-k}) (\frac{\epsilon}{e(q_E + n)})$$

So, here exists a type III adversary A_{III} can breaks the proxy multi-signature scheme, then there exists an algorithm \mathcal{B} which is able to use A_{III} to solve an instance of the CDH problem with a non-negligible probability.

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He Du born in 1984. Ph.D. candidate. His current research area includes Applied Cryptography and Network Security.



Jian Wang born in 1968. Ph.D., Professor. Ph.D. supervisor. His research interest includes Broadcast Encryption, Security issues on Wireless Sensor Network and Ad-hoc, Identification Authentication, Security Metrics of Software and System, etc.